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Abstract 
The paper provides an overview of the 2014 presidential elections in Turkey, a seminal moment in 
Turkish political history. President-elect Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s aspiration for transforming Turkey 
into a presidential system is expected to have significant ramifications for Turkey and the Middle 
East. The paper examines the unique aspects of the presidential elections, focusing on the nomi-
nation process and election campaigns. It also sheds light on the external voting campaign and its 
results, as the diaspora vote constituted one of the novelties of these elections. Future implica-
tions of the election results are analysed by focusing on the current political situation in Turkey. 
The paper concludes that the presidential election process did not overcome the hardening divi-
sions among the key groupings in Turkey, political polarization is therefore likely to continue and 
the election process has actually added to the climate of uncertainty regarding the design and 
functioning of political institutions.  
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“Today, the day that the first publicly elected president is inaugurated, is the day when Turkey 
rises from its ashes, when the construction and development of a new Turkey gains force.”1 
                                                                                     Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  
1. Introduction 
On 10 August 2014 a presidential election was held in Turkey to determine the twelfth president 
of the Republic. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the winner of the race, securing 
slightly over 51% of the votes in the first round. The election attracted significant domestic and 
international media attention as it was the first time that the president was being elected through 
direct vote2 and it was anticipated that this would be the beginning of a new era for Turkey. Prior 
to the election, Erdoğan emphasized numerous times that he intended to change the constitution 
in order to give the presidency, a mostly ceremonial post according to the current constitution, a 
powerful executive role.3 The election was also considered a test for Erdoğan’s popularity and the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) legitimacy, as it took place shortly after a number of political 
crises: only one year after the country’s famous Gezi protests4 which challenged Erdoğan’s increas-
ingly authoritarian policies and was considered to be one of the most important grassroots politi-
cal movements in recent times; only eight months after the corruption allegations that forced four 
ministers to resign;5 the fallout with the Gülen Movement;6 and three months after the Soma min-
ing tragedy that exposed the failure of government regulation in an accident-prone industry.7 
 
1
‘Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sworn in as Turkey’s President’, Financial Times, 28 August 2014, [Online], Available: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e343f986-2ebc-11e4-afe4-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3BmFcvBDV, [11 September 2014].  
2
 Previously the members of the parliament elected the president for a single seven-year term.  
3
“Turkey's Erdogan Seeks An Expanded Role As President,” NPR, 10 August 2014, [Online], Available: 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/08/10/339266869/turkeys-erdogan-seeks-an-expanded-role-as-president; 
Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkish Premier Runs for President, an Office He Plans to Strengthen,” New York 
Times, 1 July 2014. 
4
 For more information on the Gezi Protests see Amnesty International’s comprehensive report published in October 
2013: https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/eur440222013en.pdf. 
5
 For more info on this topic see ‘Turkish Minister’s Sons Arrested in Corruption and Bribery Investigation, The Guardi-
an, 17 December 2013, [Online], Available: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/turkish-ministers-sons-
arrested-corruption-investigation [5 November 2014]. ‘No longer a shining example’, The Economist, 4 January 2014.   
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In the wake of these crises, Erdoğan’s future performance in what is a deeply divided society and 
tense domestic political environment is a matter of concern. While Erdoğan and his followers 
claim that the election results will usher in a new period of prosperity and national glory (what 
they call ‘New Turkey’), the domestic opposition and international observers note the country’s 
drift towards authoritarianism. For all the encouraging narratives of further democratization and 
development on Erdoğan’s part, policy experts and representatives of international organizations 
declared their concerns regarding one-man rule, censorship and the disappearance of the rule of 
law in Turkey. Election reporting also reflected many of these concerns. For instance, according to 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the election process took place 
in an environment dominated by Erdoğan and his party.8 Observers pointed to the increasingly 
authoritarian nature of Erdoğan’s prime ministry, and it was thus feared that the election results 
would only serve to consolidate his grip on power, enabling him to further entrench his power 
through constitutional amendments and other legal and policy changes.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of this important election in the context of recent 
political developments in Turkey. The paper argues that the presidential election process, far from 
overcoming the institutional impasse and political polarization, has actually added to the climate 
of uncertainty in the design of political institutions. Every political movement in the country is like-
ly to go through a period of self-reflection on its leadership, strategies and overall goals. Not sur-
prisingly, both the governing Justice and Development Party and the opposition Republican Peo-
 
6
 The Gülen Movement is a faith-based community led by Fethullah Gülen, a priest living in self-exile in the United 
States. The Movement has developed to become one of the most powerful business and political networks inside and 
outside Turkey, and has supported the AKP government since its early years. This alliance has enabled Gülenists to 
take over key judicial and security institutions. For more info see ‘The clash of former allies: The AKP versus the Gulen 
Movement, 7 March 2014, [Online], Available: http://www.mei.edu/content/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-gulen-
movement, [5 November 2014]. Or see Kadri Gursel’s article at Al Monitor ‘Gulenist-AKP Clash is not in the Open’, 16 
August 2013, [Online], Available: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/turkey-erdogan-akp-gulenism-
the-service-power-struggle.html [5 November 2014].  
7
 For more info please see ‘Soma Tragedy: Erdogan Faces Fall-Out from Mine Disaster’, Der Spiegel, 19 May 2014, 
[Online], Available: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/soma-mine-disaster-reveals-cracks-in-turkish-
leadership-a-970284.html, [5 November 2014].  
8
 ‘International Election Observation Mission: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions’, 11 August 2014, 
[Online], Available: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/122553?download=true, [11 September 2014]. 
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ple’s Party (CHP) held conventions soon after the presidential election,9 and the Kurdish political 
movement has begun to discuss its options in the fast-changing Turkish and Middle Eastern land-
scape. Moreover the country has seen more than its share of political crises in the past two years 
in the form of mass protests, corruption allegations, and politically motivated purges in the judici-
ary. A new and more-or-less stable institutional structure is needed in the face of the challenges at 
home and abroad, but President-elect Erdoğan’s ambition to amend the constitution along the 
lines he prefers will probably aggravate the uncertainty, at least in the short-term.10    
The paper is organized as follows: the first section examines the historical background of the pres-
idential elections. The second section describes the political stakes involved in the 2014 presiden-
tial race, paying specific attention to some of the novel features of the election. The following two 
sections present an analysis of the nomination process and the candidates’ campaign promises 
and strategies, situating them against the backdrop of recent political developments in Turkey. 
The fifth section addresses one of the novelties of this race, namely the diaspora vote. The sixth 
section offers an analysis of the election results and the consequent political climate. The paper 
concludes with some predictions about the future of electoral politics and institutional design in 
Turkey.  
2. Background 
The AKP has been in power since 2002. Since then they have managed to build a stable winning 
coalition, in great part thanks to relatively successful economic growth rates11 – the downsides of 
this growth model will be discussed below. The party and its leader, Erdoğan, have also taken 
credit for legislating various European Union (EU) accession reforms during the early years of 
government, especially those pertaining to fundamental liberties. In turn, the secularist opposition 
 
9
 ‘CHP to hold extraordinary convention in fall: Kılıçdaroğlu’, Hurriyet Daily News, 15 August 2014; Tulin Daloglu, ‘Er-
dogan out, Davutoglu in as AKP leader’, Al-Monitor, August 2014. [Online], Available: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/turkey-akp-davutoglu-new-prime-minister.html [11 September 2014]. 
10
 See the following report for more info: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote23_Cagaptay-2.pdf. 
11
 OECD indicators demonstrate that Turkey has managed to retain relatively high levels of growth even after the 
2008-9 crisis, even though the unemployment has been consistently above the OECD average. See 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/turkey-economic-forecast-summary.htm  
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represented by the CHP and its former leader Deniz Baykal emphasized the secularist-Islamist 
dichotomy as the central axis of Turkish politics. The AKP’s claim to hold together a socially 
conservative yet politically liberal-democratic coalition of voters enabled it to confront the military 
and high courts in moments of tension, as various reform-minded intellectuals, as well as foreign 
actors, supported the government against what they perceived as the encroachments of militantly 
secularist and undemocratic opponents. Finally, the ‘Kurdish opening’ envisioned a reform process 
with regards to Kurdish minority rights, including a state-sponsored Kurdish TV channel and the 
use of Kurdish languages at various universities (Tekdemir, 2014).12 More importantly, the AKP has 
underlined its determination to resolve the Kurdish Question and has initiated a vague yet popular 
initiative to end the conflict with the Kurdish rebels.  
However, for all the self-claimed policy successes and undeniable electoral victories, the 
opposition to the AKP has become more vocal over the years. As will be discussed in the rest of 
the section, the AKP’s economic model, relying on developments in the housing market and the 
construction sector (not to mention rampant corruption),13 and incurring a high degree of 
individual and government debt, imposes great risks for human life, the environment and financial 
stability. The government’s rhetoric of human rights and democratization contrasts sharply with 
the lack of serious reform and a shift away from the protection of basic liberties. The unofficial 
ceasefire has brought calm to the Kurdish region, as battle deaths due to armed confrontations 
between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish military fell sharply between March 
2013 and September 2014, but the government has not taken the promised bold steps regarding 
the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue. The confrontation with the high courts and the 
military was supposed to end the grip of undemocratic institutions on political decision-making, 
but the AKP leadership appears more interested in staffing tutelary bodies (like the Supreme 
Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the Board of Higher Education) with loyalists than dissolving 
 
12
 See also: Michael M. Gunter, ‘The Closing of Turkey’s Kurdish Opening’, Columbia SIPA Journal of International Af-
fairs, 20 September 2012, [Online], Available: http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/closing-turkeys-kurdish-
opening/, [11 September 2014].  
13
 Corruption appears to be intrinsic part of the economic and political model, rather than an incidental side effect. 
Nepotistic and corrupt relationships between public and private actors have allowed the AKP government to arrange 
public bids, distribute mining and land grants, and deregulate labor standards. For an incisive analysis, see: Aslı Iğsız, 
‘Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests: Authoritarianism, Law, and Neoliberalism (Part One)’, Jadaliyya, 12July 2013, 
[Online], Available: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12907/brand-turkey-and-the-gezi-
protests_authoritarianis 
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or reforming them.14 The much-celebrated military coup trials ended on an anti-climactic note, as 
the due-process violations throughout the trials left them devoid of procedural legitimacy and 
scores of defendants were released almost immediately after the government’s fallout with the 
Gülen movement, which was assumed to orchestrate the prosecutions.15  
The AKP’s attempt to position itself as a catch-all party has resulted in a contradictory rhetoric that 
straddles Turkish nationalism and Islamism, neo-liberal principles and social-protectionist ones, 
political liberalism and intolerance towards individuals and groups who do not fit the AKP’s social 
and political vision. This ambiguity partly explains why more than a decade of one-party rule and a 
string of election victories do not provide clear signals for where Erdoğan and his party stand on 
most issues. One thing is beyond doubt, though: “In 2002, the AKP came into power and into 
bitter confrontation with the self-appointed guardians of the Turkish establishment. A decade on, 
it has become the establishment.”16 
As a result of these tensions, the social and political distance between the AKP voters and the 
opposition has been widening for some time.17 Arguably, each election process widened this gap. 
For instance, the 2010 referendum on the constitutional amendments saw a degree of political 
polarization far beyond voters’ differing views on the content of the amendments. Likewise, 
 
14
 These Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the Board of Higher Education were established after the 1980 
coup to increase the executive’s and military’s control over the judiciary and universities. A constitutional amendment 
in 2010 democratized the selection mechanism for the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, but the opacity of 
the election process has been questioned since. The first elected Board reflected the alliance of the Gülenists and the 
AKP, but following the breakup of this coalition, the government sought to purge the Gülenists in October 2014 
election for some of the seats on the Board. For recent developments, see Kadri Gursel’s ‘AKP pursues scorched-earth 
tactics against Gulenists’, Al-Monitor, 4 September 2014 [Online], Available: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-akp-gulen-rift-erdogan-judiciary.html#, [5 November 2014]. The Board 
of Higher Education is likewise dominated by pro-government academics.  
15
 See Soner Cagaptay, ‘What's Really behind Turkey's Coup Arrests?’, Foreign Policy, 25 February 2010, [Online], 
Available: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/25/whats_really_behind_turkeys_coup_arrests, [11 Sep-
tember 2014]. See also: Gareth Jenkins, ‘Falling Facades: The Gulen Movement and Turkey’s Escalating Power Strug-
gle’, Turkey Analyst (2014), [Online], Available:  http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-
articles/item/81-falling-facades-the-g%C3%BClen-movement-and-turkeys-escalating-power-struggle.html. 
16
 A. Finkel, ‘What now for Turkey’s Ruling Party?’, BBC, 31 October 2012, [Online], Available: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20141894, [11 September 2014]. 
17
 This is not to argue that the opposition is a unified bloc, or that the discontent with the AKP has remained constant 
over time for different sections of the opposition. At least a section of the nationalist and socially conservative voters 
of the MHP appear to agree with the AKP in various ideological dimensions. Many self-designated liberals supported 
the AKP until 2011, if not later, and withdrew their support only recently.  
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strong presence of Erdoğan and his vision for a new Turkey dominated the campaign before the 
2011 general election, yet the opposition, which was divided along every dimension except in its 
antipathy towards the AKP, saw another resounding AKP victory. Even the March 2014 municipal 
election became a platform to contest national-level differences, rather than local ones. The top 
two opposition parties, Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) have 
not been able to capture sufficient votes to unseat the AKP or force it into a coalition government 
since 2002. The party of the Kurdish political movement, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP),18 
has managed to challenge AKP’s hegemony at the municipal level, but it is worth noting that its 
impact remains limited at the national level. All in all, different opposition actors disagree with the 
AKP government for different reasons, and they are not united; yet the government’s dismissive 
and repressive attitude towards dissent – one should only be reminded of police violence during 
peaceful protests, the increasing number of journalists under arrest, and constant references to 
conspiracies implicating domestic and foreign enemies – results in a political atmosphere that 
seems to be in constant crisis mode.   
This dismissive attitude towards all kinds of dissent and heavy-handed treatment of protest 
brought things to a boiling point in late May 2013. Spur-of-the-moment protests that started in 
Istanbul’s Taksim Square spread throughout the country. Initially a small group of young people 
were organizing a sit-in at the Gezi Park across from Taksim Square, protesting against the 
government’s urban development. The police brutality and disproportionate violence meted out 
during a peaceful protest touched a nerve and transformed the protests into a mass 
demonstration against urban transformation, environmental degradation, and restrictions on the 
freedom of speech, peaceful protest and press freedom.19 Excessive amounts of tear gas and 
water cannons were used to suppress the protestors. Police violence resulted in several deaths as 
well as injuries to many others, which, in turn, drew the attention of the international community. 
Domestic media institutions were under constant pressure from the government; consequently 
 
18
 BDP politicians established the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) in 2013 to run for municipal elections in the 
western parts of Turkey. Since then the two parties have more or less merged in their membership and 
administration; therefore it is common practice to see BDP, HDP and BDP/HDP used interchangeably.  
19
 For more info see C. B. Tensel, ‘The Gezi Park Occupation: Confronting Authoritarian Neo-Liberalism’, Open Democ-
racy (2013), [Online], Available: https://www.opendemocracy.net/cemal-burak-tansel/gezi-park-occupation-
confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism, [11 September 2014]. 
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most of them did not dare to televise what was going on despite the fact that it was a critical 
moment in Turkish history.  
The Gezi protests reflected the long-standing discontent among various groups who felt that they 
did not belong in the AKP’s vision of Turkey. The verbal attacks against cultural, political, ethnic 
and religious minorities, ranging from accusations of alcohol abuse and moral depravity to 
disparaging remarks about their ethnic or religious background, were prevalent before the Gezi 
protests (and were probably among the reasons why so many people found it necessary to defy 
Erdoğan), but these accusations only became more aggressive during and after the protests. The 
prime minister and other ministers have blamed the international community, some unnamed 
foreign countries, and a supposed lobby that sought a sharp increase in the interest rate, for the 
protests.  
The Gezi uprisings brought together a social movement that gained support from people with 
different political convictions and party affiliations, as well as others who had never been part of 
any ideological group before but felt the urge to act against the AKP’s increasingly authoritarian 
rule. It revealed that Turkey was far from the rosy picture that the government was trying to 
portray to its voters and the outside world. What is also striking is that the so-called secular-
conservative divide, which has been a lazy label to describe the nature of political polarization by 
many academics, policy experts, journalists and the like, does not suffice to explain the 
transformations and fragmentations in Turkey.  
The Gezi protests may have revealed the government’s shortcomings and emboldened 
countervailing forces, but they did not change the way things were getting done in Ankara, at least 
in the short-term.20 Yet, another crisis, perhaps resulting from the opportunity structure after the 
protests, tested the government’s internal cohesion. The Gülen movement, in alliance with the 
AKP government since its early days and in charge of much of the police, intelligence and judicial 
activity thanks to this alliance, initiated a powerful campaign against Erdoğan, who was in turn 
trying to choke the movement’s financial resources by closing down the mostly Gülenist-run 
 
20
 O. Bakiner, ‘Gezi at One: Rethinking the Legacy of the Gezi Protests”, Jadaliyya, 6 June 2014, [Online], Available: 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18023/gezi-at-one_rethinking-the-legacy-of-the-protests, [11 September 
2014]. 
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private education institutions. As the rivalry intensified, unknown sources began to release 
audiotapes that implicated several government ministers, businesspeople, and the prime 
minister’s own family in an elaborate network of corruption.21  
Since December 2013 the pro-Gülen police officers and prosecutors have been looking for ways to 
indict AKP leaders for corruption, while Erdoğan and his close circle of loyalists in the government 
are busy purging the Gülenists from the police and the judiciary. The corruption allegations, the 
resignation of implicated ministers, and the internal division of social conservatives led the 
opposition to hope that the AKP would lose votes. Yet, the corruption scandal has not cost the AKP 
as many votes as one would assume: the party carried the March 2014 municipal elections in most 
regions of the country. The results of the local elections illustrated that the AKP and its charismatic 
leader Erdoğan managed to maintain the more-or-less unconditional loyalty of most of their 
supporters. Yet, the scandal has left behind an institutional impasse: Erdoğan wants to redesign 
the police, intelligence and judicial institutions, but has not succeeded in doing so.  
Immediately after the local elections, the country was shaken by reports from the mining town of 
Soma in Western Anatolia on 13 May 2014. 301 miners were killed in an explosion that caused an 
underground fire in the Soma Mine – the worst mining disaster in Turkish history. Upon close 
inspection, it became clear that the tragedy, like so many others that go unreported, could have 
been avoided if the management had acted responsibly and if the government had enforced 
precautionary regulations. The Soma tragedy was neither an accident nor an isolated event; it 
exposed the dark side of Turkey’s neoliberal growth trajectory that set no moral or legal limits on 
businesses that wanted to reduce labour costs. Erdoğan and the AKP could have paid a political 
price for such a tragedy,22 but it was not (and still is not) clear if the opposition could propose an 
effective alternative that would convince the voters.  
 
21
 It is also important to underline here that a significant amount of the corruption allegations were about violations of 
the ‘zoning code, zoning of urban lands under conservation for construction, the illegal provision of building permits, 
informal relations and bribery.’ B. Kose, ‘The Culmination of Resistance Against Urban Neoliberalism in Turkey’, ROAR 
Magazine (2014) [Online], Available: http://roarmag.org/2014/01/resistance-urban-neoliberalism-turkey/, [11 Sep-
tember 2014]. 
22
 Some observers even argued that Erdoğan could choose not to run for president after the Soma tragedy. For exam-
ple see Der Spiegel’s report on Soma: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/soma-mine-disaster-reveals-
cracks-in-turkish-leadership-a-970284.html [11 September 2014]. 
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In conclusion, a government that was still popular yet encountering serious policy failures was 
confronting angry yet hopelessly divided opposition groups on the eve of the presidential election. 
It was in this context that Erdoğan launched his campaign for the highest office of the country. 
3. Presidential elections in Turkey: What was special? 
The office of the president is endowed with limited power in modern Turkey. Article 104 of the 
current constitution gives the president the authority to approve or veto laws, send bills to the 
Constitutional Court, appoint members to important judicial and bureaucratic institutions, declare 
a state of emergency, and represent the state in the international arena, but does not grant explic-
it policy-making powers as would be the case in a presidential system. The constitution does name 
the president “head of the state,” but, in practice, presidents have not used this title for running 
government affairs. Formally the parliament has elected the president, although it should be not-
ed that Turkey’s long history of military interventions has meant that the members of the parlia-
ment enjoyed little discretion until at least 1989 – former generals were chosen as president be-
tween 1961 and 1980, and the de facto military ruler was elected president in a questionable ref-
erendum in 1982. Popular politicians have often toyed with the idea of a stronger presidency, but 
no government has succeeded in passing the required institutional modifications.    
The constitutional amendment of 2007 (Amendment 21/10/2007-5678/2) created an interesting 
situation in this regard. It stipulated popular elections for the office of the president, the first to be 
held in 2014. This change aimed to boost the electoral legitimacy of the office, but did not alter its 
powers and responsibilities. The period between 2007 and today saw the increasing consolidation 
of political power under the Justice and Development Party government and its leader, Recep Tay-
yip Erdoğan, which reignited the debate on the merits of a presidential regime. Erdoğan’s sup-
porters advocated a strong, policy-making president, while the opposition voiced the concern that 
such a shift would result in a dictatorship or some kind of competitive authoritarianism in the ab-
sence of meaningful checks and balances on presidential power. In the end, Erdoğan’s ambition 
did not disappear, but there was no constitutional change to enable a presidential regime.    
Ethnopolitics Papers | No.  
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For Erdoğan, there was an additional reason to seek a stronger presidency. The rift within the gov-
erning coalition has led to a vicious power struggle between Erdoğan’s supporters and the Gülen 
movement since late 2013.23 As described earlier, unidentified people who are suspected of hav-
ing ties to the Gülen movement have publicized evidence pointing to corruption involving Erdoğan 
and his family. As a result, Erdoğan needs immunity from prosecution, which, in turn, means that 
he needs to stay in politics. Furthermore, his reaction to the corruption allegations was to start a 
witch-hunt in the police and the judiciary in the hope of eliminating Gülenists. The overhaul of the 
police and the judiciary has resulted in a chaotic situation whereby no actor, including Erdoğan 
himself, seems to have sufficient information and authority to rearrange these institutions and 
stabilize the bureaucracy. Under these circumstances Erdoğan’s best strategy was to acquire even 
more power for himself and those around him. 
The other actors on the political stage have long defended the continuation of the parliamentary 
system. Therefore, the CHP, the MHP and the Kurdish political movement declared that the 2014 
presidential elections should present a choice between candidates, rather than between systems 
of government. HDP’s candidate Selahattin Demirtaş even declared that he would opt for limiting 
the powers of the president and the central government in order to pave the way for a more de-
centralised system.24  
After much discussion and debate, a two-round run-off was the chosen election procedure, which 
is quite typical in presidential systems, but was a novelty in Turkey. Accordingly, each candidate 
should receive at least 50% of the votes in order to get elected. In case none of the candidates 
could reach this percentage in the first round, a second round was to be held between the two 
 
23
 See the link for more information on this topic: G. H. Jenkins, G.H, ‘Falling Facades:  The Gulen Movement and Tur-
key’s Escalating Power Struggle,’ Turkey Analyst, (2014), [Online], Available:  
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/81-falling-facades-the-g%C3%BClen-
movement-and-turkeys-escalating-power-struggle.html, [11 September 2014].  
24
 See Demirtaş’ interview with The Wall Street Journal: 
http://www.wsj.com.tr/article/SB10001424052702303714604580029093368783392.html, [11 September 2014].  
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candidates who received the highest percentage of the votes in the first round. This made inter-
party electoral coalitions and strategic voting possible.25 
4. The nomination process 
Public debates about Turkey’s first popular election for presidency focused on two interrelated 
questions: first, would Prime Minister Erdoğan run for president, and second, would the largely 
symbolic office of the president be transformed if Erdoğan were elected? It is important to note 
that the 30 March 2014 local elections tested the waters for all parties. Although the local elec-
tions were about municipal governance, the climate of political polarization after the Gezi protests 
and the corruption scandal meant that they could be considered, in Cagaptay and Jeffrey’s words, 
a ‘quasi-referendum’.26 As the municipal elections revealed that the AKP did not suffer huge losses 
among voters despite the important events mentioned above, most observers anticipated that 
Erdoğan would not face a sudden loss of support for the presidential elections. 
It was clear that Erdoğan wanted nothing less than a strong presidency for himself, even though 
the constitution did not grant the president such power. Furthermore, the coherence of the ruling 
AKP depended in large measure on Erdoğan’s personal management of all the intra-party dynam-
ics, so his departure for a higher office could potentially lead to in-fighting. Especially then-
President Abdullah Gül’s possible return to the AKP could have complicated those dynamics, since 
Gül was among the few people who had sufficient support and legitimacy inside the party to stand 
up to Erdoğan’s one-man rule. Despite these constraints, Erdoğan decided to run for president. 
Around the time that Erdoğan was testing the waters for his candidacy, the opposition was busy 
searching for a contender. The main opposition, CHP, held meetings with all opposition parties to 
nominate a consensus candidate. Since the CHP’s vote share in general and municipal elections 
has oscillated between 20% and 26% in the past decade, its leaders thought that reaching out to 
conservatives and perhaps the Kurdish voters was the only way to stop a comfortable Erdoğan 
 
25
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26
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victory. In the end, the CHP announced Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, an academic and former diplomat 
who was little known inside the country, as the consensus candidate. The “consensus” reflected 
an agreement between the CHP and the MHP, to the exclusion of the Kurdish political movement. 
Later, a number of small parties (whose combined vote share does not exceed 5%) decided to 
support İhsanoğlu’s candidacy. After the fallout with the CHP, the Kurdish political movement, 
represented by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and its offshoot People’s Democracy Party 
(HDP) in the parliament, decided to nominate Selahattin Demirtaş, a young lawyer and politician 
who served as the HDP’s (and previously the BDP’s) co-chair.  
Virtually every person in Turkey knows who Erdoğan is and what he stands for. Therefore, his 
campaign was premised less on presenting him to the voters than delivering his message of strong 
presidency. Conversely, the other candidates did have to build familiarity and rapport with the 
voters. İhsanoğlu was born and raised in Egypt, and his achievements as a historian and as former 
Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) earned him reputation in aca-
demic and diplomatic circles, but he was unknown to the general public.27 The CHP’s expectation 
in nominating him was to break the ice with the observant Muslim masses (for, after all, much of 
his intellectual and diplomatic work dealt with Islamic history and institutions) without losing the 
secularist voter base (İhsanoğlu is known to lead a secular life). In a country where more than half 
the population votes for parties with a socially conservative outlook, the CHP leadership opted for 
a strategy of deemphasizing its secularist roots, and instead presenting İhsanoğlu as an enlight-
ened Muslim and cool-headed gentleman who could overcome the polarization and bitterness of 
politics under the AKP. It was hoped that İhsanoğlu would win over the sceptical secularists who 
disliked the implicit legitimation of political Islam through his nomination, and get votes from na-
tionalist MHP voters as well as some AKP voters who no longer supported Erdoğan.  
Demirtaş was facing another uphill battle. He was supported by the Kurdish movement, which 
secured majority vote shares in much of the Kurdish region, but did not get more than 6-7% na-
 
27
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tionwide. Even though the BDP/HDP spokespersons emphasize that their message of democratiza-
tion and peace should appeal to all citizens, the majority of the non-Kurdish voters tend to identify 
these parties with the Kurdish movement in Turkey and ignore their overall message, or hold an 
actively antagonistic stance against what they consider “terrorists without weapons.” Demirtaş, 
described as the “candidate of the oppressed” by his supporters, campaigned on a message of 
solidarity across race, ethnicity, and gender lines, hoping to overcome the perceptions that were 
produced and reproduced throughout the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish in-
surgency. His hope was to attract the left-leaning voters, Kurdish and non-Kurdish, across the 
country, and especially in the larger cities. He was presented by the international media as a popu-
lar candidate for the Kurds as well as democratic, liberal, environmentalist and left-leaning Turkish 
voters. 
5. Election campaigns 
The election campaigns reflected the candidates’ expectations and strategies. What made the 
campaign process unusual was that Erdoğan was aspiring for a hands-on presidency, whereas İh-
sanoğlu and Demirtaş did not seek policy-making power. It was as though one candidate was run-
ning for an entirely different position.28 Overall, Erdoğan continued to deliver his signature 
speeches full of vitriol, while emphasising the message that he would be a strong president if 
elected. He presented his self-declared policy achievements as leader of the AKP as proof of future 
success. His publicity campaign, which included socializing with businesspeople and celebrities 
over dinners or soccer games, stirred much controversy for its politicization of every walk of life, 
yet it was the message that Erdoğan wanted everyone to understand before he moved to the 
higher office: it pays off to be inside his entourage.  
Meanwhile, İhsanoğlu spent considerable time and energy to demonstrate his credentials as an 
appropriate candidate for nationalists and social conservatives, as well as secular-minded voters. 
His speeches, meetings and selective tomb visits to commemorate deceased right-wing politicians 
were meant to portray the image of a candidate who shared the worldview of right-leaning voters. 
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He was calm and respectful, in obvious contrast to Erdoğan. For all his individual efforts, İhsanoğlu 
appeared isolated for much of the campaign period. The CHP and MHP leaders were supportive, 
but there was no grassroots mobilization for the candidate. Indeed, polls showed that many CHP 
voters were apathetic, and large sections of MHP voters tended to favour Erdoğan over İhsanoğlu. 
As we shall see, the lack of grassroots support haunted the İhsanoğlu candidacy all the way to the 
end.29 
In accordance with his claim to represent disadvantaged sectors, Demirtaş met with women’s 
groups, LGBTI organizations, and paid a visit to the site of the Soma mining tragedy. While Erdoğan 
offered more of the same under a new institutional setting and İhsanoğlu offered more of the 
same with a new face, Demirtaş spoke of substantive change. Despite his presence in national pol-
itics for several years, most people knew little about him or his family. Through interviews in the 
media, the Demirtaş family showed that they led simple, unpretentious lives.30 His witty reminders 
of the enormous wealth gap between himself and Erdoğan served to accentuate this image. As a 
result, Demirtaş did manage to overcome the initial scepticism of many non-Kurdish voters about 
voting for the representative of the Kurdish political movement. Another unique aspect of his 
campaign was the use of Kurdish language throughout the election campaigns.31   
A word on the financing of the campaign process: the state has traditionally provided public fi-
nancing for political parties that receive more than 3% of the total vote, and the state television is 
mandated to provide equal propaganda time for candidates in general elections. Since the presi-
dential election was not party-based, private financing became an important issue for the first 
time. Erdoğan used his own business connections as well as the AKP’s machinery to raise funds, 
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while the other two candidates managed to raise much smaller sums.32 Therefore, in a country 
with no history of citizen-backed campaign financing the incumbent with wealthy connections had 
an easy financial victory over the little-known candidate and the “candidate of the oppressed.” 
Moreover, the state television (TRT) decided to forfeit its mandate in order to support Erdoğan’s 
candidacy: İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş received a tiny fraction of the time that Erdoğan did on publicly 
funded channels throughout the campaign process, not to mention the fact that most private me-
dia networks are either at the hands of businesspeople affiliated with Erdoğan’s entourage or have 
been practicing self-censorship in order not to antagonize Erdoğan.   
The OSCE’s report on the presidential elections explains this situation: 
While all three candidates actively campaigned, the campaign of the Prime Minister 
was the most visible. The misuse of state administrative resources and lack of clear 
distinction of key institutional events with campaign activities granted him an un-
due advantage, contrary to national legislation and at odds with paragraph 5.4 of 
the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and the Report on the Misuse of Adminis-
trative Resources during Electoral Processes by the Council of Europe’s Commission 
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).33 
In conclusion, although de jure freedom of assembly was recognized and all the candidates had 
the right to campaign freely, Erdoğan’s position as the Prime Minister gave him a significant ad-
vantage in terms of media coverage and visibility.34 Campaign financing and publicity were heavily 
biased in favour of Erdoğan, and at least in the case of the state television, this was done illegally.  
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6. External Voting Rights and Election Campaigns Abroad 
External voting is one of the many mechanisms that home states implement in order to keep the 
diaspora involved/interested in homeland politics. The extension of citizenship to the members of 
diaspora and the right to cast the absentee vote give diaspora members a feeling of attachment 
and a sense of belonging that remind them that they are still part of the political processes of a 
country where they call ‘home’ even if they do not currently reside there.35 Therefore, external 
voters have a stake in ‘determining the future of the polity’ in their homeland.36 According to the 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), around 115 countries have regulations 
that allow external voting mechanisms.37 In some countries, the scope of the external voting is 
limited due to the small size of the emigrants and in some others it might play a key role. In the 
Turkish case, the estimated difference that the external voters can make in an election is around 1 
to 5%.38 
What was interesting about the August 2014 presidential elections was that for the first time 
2,798,726 Turkish citizens who reside outside Turkish borders had the right to vote to elect the 
president directly.39 This number constitutes almost 5% of the electorate. Absentee voting had 
been introduced almost three decades earlier; however Turkish citizens who lived abroad could 
only cast their votes at the border, which was a limitation that negatively affected the participa-
tion rate. This was changed with the 2008 amendment to the law on elections and voter registra-
tion40 and with a more recent amendment in 2012,41 when the AKP government introduced regu-
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lations in order to facilitate voting procedures for Turkish immigrants.42  In May 2012 migrants 
from Turkey obtained the right to vote at the consulates and embassies in their host countries.43 In 
places where the number of potential voters is large, such as Germany, the government negotiat-
ed with host states in order to set up stadiums, schools or other convention rooms in order to dis-
tribute ballot stations. This could be interpreted as a sign of the AKP’s new policy towards the 
Turks abroad, which was based on creating an active and politically mobilized diaspora, who have 
thus far built scattered networks and produced low political impact in the host countries despite 
their large population.44 
There are reportedly 1.5 million Turkish citizens eligible to vote in Germany, the country that hosts 
the highest number of first- and second-generation immigrants from Turkey (nearly 3 million). 
France is second with more than 600,000 migrants from Turkey, the Netherlands third with more 
than 450,000, Austria fourth with around 270,000 and Belgium fifth with nearly 200,000. The 
United States has around 85,000.45 For the presidential elections, the Supreme Electoral Board has 
set up ballot boxes in 54 countries (with 118 representations) where more than 500 Turkish citi-
zens live. The absentee votes were cast between July 31 and August 3, 2014 and they were sent to 
Turkey through the diplomatic courier system to be counted all together with the other votes cast 
inside Turkey.46 This procedure drew a lot of criticism for its proneness to election fraud, especially 
among the anti-AKP media outlets in the diaspora. 
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Turkey’s politics have long had a transnational dimension thanks to the Turkish and Kurdish mi-
grants and asylum seekers who carried their ‘struggle’ outside Turkish borders, by political move-
ments in Turkey that established satellite institutions abroad, and by the Turkish state itself 
through its official mechanisms which were established to facilitate and monitor its citizens’ life 
abroad.47 Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the election campaigns and the rhetoric that 
they created also diffused to Europe, with Germany in particular becoming the heart of transna-
tional election campaigns. It was clear that the simmering tensions in Turkey during the last dec-
ade were reflected within the migrant groups from Turkey. The first sign of this was Erdoğan’s visit 
to Germany in May 2014, which caused uproar among the diaspora members who opposed the 
AKP and Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule in Turkey. Several German newspapers commented on the 
issue and some institutions even expressed their expectation that he would cancel his visit.  When 
he visited Cologne on 24 May 2014, the political divisions were very much visible in Germany, 
where left-leaning Alevite and Kurdish groups were protesting while Erdoğan’s supporters were 
laying rose petals on his way. It is said that 45,000 to 50,000 people protested against Erdoğan’s 
visit, while 15,000 people were welcoming his presence with a demonstration.48 What was inter-
esting to see was that the anti-Erdoğan protest was not solely organized by the diaspora in Ger-
many but supporters came from all over Europe, including the United Kingdom, by using all means 
of transport just to show their solidarity. Some TV channels in Turkey broadcast the whole protest 
event live. The synchronization of the campaigning mechanisms at home and abroad was one of 
the most spectacular phenomena during the presidential election campaigns. 
CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu also visited Essen in Germany in early June 2014, right after Erdoğan’s visit. 
His move was welcomed by many German media outlets and caused less controversy compared to 
Erdoğan’s visit. During his speech addressing CHP supporters in Germany, he constantly referred 
to the Soma mine incident and the Gezi protests in order to give the message that CHP condemns 
the current policies of the government and the veer to more authoritarian rule in Turkey. He visit-
ed Germany again at the end of June in order to present CHP and MHP’s joint candidate İhsanoğlu 
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to the Turks and political circles abroad. As enthusiastic as his program sounded, CHP leader’s 
speeches failed to convince many traditional CHP voters to vote for the joint-candidate. For in-
stance, many Alevites in Germany, who are seen as the CHP’s secular voter base abroad, voiced 
concerns over the CHP’s candidate, partly because his close relations with the Sunni Gulf monar-
chies raised suspicions of a sectarian bias in his worldview. While there is no conclusive evidence 
to assess whether they voted for İhsanoğlu, it can be presumed that they did not campaign 
enthusiastically for him.  
Demirtaş also recognized the importance of the diaspora vote and its potential impact on the elec-
tion results.49 He organized an election campaign in Europe and visited cities with considerable 
Turkish and Kurdish populations. In his speeches in the diaspora, he followed the exact same style 
that he pursued in Turkey: he talked about minority rights, further democratization in Turkey, cre-
ating possibilities for peace negotiations and finally he underlined the importance of Gezi protests 
and the demand for certain reforms regarding human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of asso-
ciation and freedom of press. Echoing his line in Turkey, he tried to overcome the perceptions that 
he was the Kurds’ candidate by presenting a more comprehensive approach to Turkey’s problems.    
7. Analysing the election results 
On 10 August 2014, Prime Minister Erdoğan received 51.8% of the votes in the first round. Ek-
meleddin İhsanoğlu (at roughly 38.4%) and Selahattin Demirtaş (at 9.8%) were far behind in terms 
of the percentage of the votes that Erdoğan received. The results mean that after nearly 12 years 
as prime minister, Erdoğan will rule Turkey five more years, this time as the president.  
The elections showed that CHP and MHP failed to expand their voter base. Cicek (2014) compares 
the percentage of votes that these two parties received in the local elections and demonstrates 
that the so-called consensus candidate’s vote share was less than the sum of each individual par-
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ty’s vote share in previous elections.50 Cicek also argues that Demirtaş’s performance at the elec-
tions could be interpreted as a success story in the sense that his vote share far exceeded the 4 to 
6 per cent that the pro-Kurdish HDP has been receiving in the elections.51 Erdoğan’s victory and 
Demirtaş’s rising profile as an important political figure in Turkish politics are the new matters of 
debate for today’s Turkey. 
Many commentators explain Erdoğan’s first-round victory with the absenteeism of voters who 
would have supported other candidates. While it is true that the turnout rate of 74% falls short of 
that of the municipal elections four months earlier, it is still impressive in a comparative light. The 
motivations of those who did not vote are yet to be studied. While one can speculate that many 
CHP and MHP voters boycotted İhsanoğlu, even Erdoğan and Demirtaş, who have received more 
votes than what their respective parties did four months before, lost votes in certain districts. In 
other words, it is difficult to verify an election boycott with the available data. What seems much 
more obvious is that many MHP voters chose Erdoğan instead of İhsanoğlu, and that İhsanoğlu’s 
right-leaning message did not manage to attract the AKP voters. 
The diaspora vote deserves special attention. The total number of votes cast abroad as well as at 
customs was 530,116 (526,541 of them were valid votes), which meant that the rate of participa-
tion was 18.94%.52 The results were disappointing in terms of participation but this is certainly not 
a Turkey-specific result, as the participation rate of the external voters is usually low across the 
board.53 With regards to the Turkish presidential election, in certain cases, such as the United 
Kingdom or Sweden, the ballot boxes were located only in capital cities and many diaspora mem-
bers could not afford to travel long distances to cast their vote. Also the information related to 
voting procedures was not distributed extensively and many diaspora members complained that 
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they did not know anything about the appointment system or other procedures. In the end the 
Supreme Electoral Board announced that Erdoğan received 329,340 votes (62.55%), İhsanoğlu 
received 153,523 votes (29.16%) and Demirtaş received 43,678 votes (8.30%) in the entire diaspo-
ra.  
Ayhan Kaya, who has written extensively about the Turkish diaspora in Europe estimates that at 
least the 40% of the diaspora members support Erdoğan or sympathize with the AKP in general. 
His research on the Turkish immigrants also suggests that the diaspora members who tended to 
keep their Turkish citizenship were the ones who had conservative leanings.54 The results point 
out a higher support level for Erdoğan outside Turkish borders, as Erdoğan received roughly 10 to 
11% more votes abroad compared to the percentage that he received in Turkey. Although the 
general results include countries that are outside Europe, the distribution of votes in Europe, 
where most Turkish migrants live, reveals how popular Erdoğan is among the diaspora members. 
One reason for his popularity is that since 2002, the AKP has considered mobilizing abroad as im-
portant as mobilizing within the country. New civil society organizations, networks, businessmen 
associations and migrant organizations have grown extensively within the last decade. Moreover, 
the AKP managed to attract conservative-leaning votes from a larger segment of the Turkish mi-
grant community. Erdoğan’s frequent visits to Germany, in which he called for the diaspora mem-
bers not to assimilate into German society55 and made constant remarks on Turkish rights within 
Germany and Europe at large, found a receptive response from Turkish migrants who feel discrim-
inated against or poorly integrated into their host communities. In addition, many diaspora voters 
have felt neglected by other political parties for so many years that they appreciated the AKP’s 
interest in formulating policy about the diaspora.  
Certainly each host country has a unique diaspora population with different political behaviour 
and varying degrees of integration and mobilization patterns.56 In Germany, Erdoğan received 
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76,817 votes while İhsanoğlu received 26,578 and Demirtaş 8,538.  In the USA, we see a different 
picture. İhsanoğlu received 8,081 votes, while Erdoğan received 1,651 and Demirtaş received 
644.57 İhsanoğlu received the majority of the votes in London, receiving 2,525 compared with 
Demirtaş 1,358 and Erdoğan 1,195.58 In Sweden, Erdoğan was the winner of the elections (with 
the following vote distribution: Erdoğan 736, İhsanoğlu 470, and Demirtaş 234) and in France he 
had a solid victory (Erdoğan 16,329, İhsanoğlu 3,774, and Demirtaş 4,634). This shows that 
Erdoğan was the most popular candidate for most, but not all, diasporas. The results also reveal 
that the profile of migrants in the diaspora determine their voting behaviour. For instance, majori-
ty of the migrants from Turkey living in the UK are estimated to be Alevites and this might be an 
explanatory factor for the results from the ballot in London. Another important observation is that 
İhsanoğlu himself did not organize visits to the diaspora populations and did not run a proactive 
campaign. It was the CHP leadership that bore the public relations part of his presidential cam-
paign in Germany and elsewhere. Diaspora voters did not know İhsanoğlu before, and did not 
have the chance to witness his own vision apart from watching his speeches on Turkish TV chan-
nels. This could also explain the low participation of CHP and MHP voters. 
Although many groups organized joint protests and actions against the AKP rule in Turkey, such as 
the above-mentioned anti-Erdoğan protests in Germany, when it came to casting votes there was 
no unity within the opposition. It was hardly there in Turkey and almost non-existent in the dias-
pora. What was also striking about the diaspora votes was that a higher percentage of votes were 
expected for Demirtaş, especially in countries such as Germany, where the Kurdish diaspora is 
politically active. It is possible to speculate that the percentage of votes for Demirtaş did not re-
flect the mobilization potential of the Kurdish political movement in the diaspora, but more evi-
dence is needed to prove this claim.  
8. Conclusion 
Erdoğan’s victory in the first round, the lacklustre performance of the consensus candidate İh-
sanoğlu, and Demirtaş’s success in capturing almost 10% of the vote as the “candidate of the op-
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pressed” sparked debates about the future of party politics. For the AKP, the question of succes-
sion is likely to unsettle the peace and stability achieved by a stream of electoral victories and 
Erdoğan’s personalistic management style. Erdoğan handpicked former Foreign Affairs Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu as his successor, to the conspicuous exclusion of other party notables, especially 
former President Abdullah Gül. So far there is no sign of a deepening crisis, but the discontent 
within the AKP may grow in the future.   
The CHP and the MHP have to come to terms with the defeat. The militant secularists in the CHP 
have already risen up in rebellion against Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and the debate about 
whether the party should shift leftward, embrace militant secularism and nationalism, or continue 
its pragmatic approach, has been reignited. The supporters of Demirtaş appear to be mildly opti-
mistic because while the vote share is far from an electoral victory, it is the first time that a candi-
date with what can be called a radical democratic discourse has managed to receive so many 
votes. 
What does the future hold for Turkey? Clearly, political polarization will not disappear quickly. 
Erdoğan delivered a conciliatory victory speech, but his previous record suggests that he thrives in 
polarized contexts. The fact that Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the main opposition party, boycotted the 
inauguration ceremony is a clear sign that further polarization is ahead, although it should be not-
ed that the sides of the polarized debate are not coherent themselves, as each major political par-
ty is divided into rival camps. In the governing AKP, the succession crisis seems to be under control 
– at least for now. Analysts ask whether the AKP will implode without Erdoğan as its leader.59 The 
opposition is divided, too, not because the spoils of success are hard to share, as is the case for the 
AKP, but because electoral failure should be properly addressed. At the time of writing, the CHP 
was facing a number of resignations after Kılıçdaroğlu consolidated his power within the party in 
the September 2014 leadership congress.  
In his victory speech Erdoğan emphasized the economy, the democratization program and the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Kurdish region as priorities: “Our main priority will be 
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developing the economy, increasing welfare, to continue with determination on our strategic path 
to the EU, continue reforms and the solution process”.60 Newly appointed Prime Minister 
Davutoğlu seconded these aspirations in a recent speech and clarified AKP’s agenda one more 
time in line with his vision of the future New Turkey. Yet, the so-called New Turkey may look very 
different from these rosy descriptions: signs of economic slowdown and a looming debt crisis are 
hard to ignore; the pace of the negotiations with the Kurdish insurgency is frustrating; and there is 
no indication of democratic reform. Added to all of these domestic difficulties is the fact that Tur-
key is engulfed in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.   
Turkey has been suffering from institutional chaos for a while now. Ever since the AKP leadership 
and their erstwhile allies in the Gülen community had the fallout, the government has been firing 
or relocating personnel in the judiciary and the police in order to eradicate the Gülenist influence. 
The chaos is likely to continue, but the 2015 general elections raise hopes for a resolution, one 
way or another. The elections will shape the parliament that Erdoğan will have to work with for 
most of his tenure. Erdoğan needs a parliament majority to empower his office, which depends 
not only on the AKP’s capacity to capture votes, but also on the possibility of opposition to 
Erdoğan’s plans inside the party. The CHP and MHP will look for ways to improve their vote shares 
in the hope that they can take part in a governing coalition. The HDP’s hope is to finally exceed the 
10% threshold, and establish itself as a powerful national-level party. 
Added to these challenges ahead, perhaps the most important problem that requires an urgent 
action plan and resolution among the others is the peace process.61 The PKK’s and BDP’s demands 
from the Turkish state include freedom for mother tongue education, recognition of Kurds as a 
distinct minority, the release of PKK detainees, improved jail conditions and eventual house arrest 
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for Öcalan, and preparing a new constitution that recognizes Kurdish rights. The AKP still shifts 
between a nationalist rhetoric and a reconciliatory attitude. The Kurdish side does not trust the 
government because of the arrests of numerous Kurdish activists and politicians, lack of progress 
in terms of the right to education in the mother tongue, and the government’s refusal to lower the 
10% national threshold for general elections. It is a peace process that is proceeding in a peculiar 
way that we are not accustomed to observe in other conflict cases in the world. There is no third-
party intervention; rather, quasi-reforms are expected to unburden a mutually hurting stalemate 
position, but the international (mostly regional) conjecture may put both sets of actors in a diffi-
cult situation in the future. The violence that broke out during the Islamic State siege of Kobane is 
a case in point. The leader of the PKK is still imprisoned, opposition parties as well as rival Kurdish 
parties are excluded from the ‘negotiation process’ and the government still has no concrete 
‘democratic package’ or an action plan. More importantly, the commission of ‘wise people’62 or-
ganized by the AKP right before the Gezi protests demonstrated that especially in Western Turkey 
trust and support for the current peace process is low. A process, which cannot guarantee societal 
support for such a process after a brutal low-scale civil war, will make the situation even harder to 
resolve in the future.  
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